NECESSITY / DEADLINE PRIOR-CASE AUDIT, 2 OCTOBER 2026 Status: bounded source inspection, not exhaustive originality clearance. 2026-10-03 FOLLOW-UP Read necessity-expanded-prior-audit.txt before interpreting this earlier audit. ADMITBench C07 directly models human escalation as an unsafe delay; C12 accepts escalation under sparse evidence. ConsequenceBench includes temporal revocation, resource races and delayed obligations. Broad timing/inaction mechanisms are therefore already represented in closer work than this earlier selected audit. The pending-commit family remains a prospective measurement candidate, not established originality or a frozen held-out test. STRUCTURAL EXTENSION NOTE The new development checkpoint starts with a delivered, positive epoch0 report and visible epoch1. Its eight-call horizon permits a fresh check plus a buffer, then a conditional authorized intervention. The queue case adds two obligations, shared verifier capacity, per-job deadlines and one competed-for buffer. These extend the measured protocol, not the originality clearance. The selected prior cases below do not establish absence of equivalent cases across whole corpora. ASIMOV's gated examples remain an explicit audit gap; the AIR SDK's extensibility also means an absence from a selected example is not inability to express a case. DISTINGUISHING DEVELOPMENT EXAMPLE Two policies both verify before an authorized transfer. In one, verification finishes at tick2 and transfer at tick3, after a tick2 deadline. In the other, a reversible buffer at tick1 extends the deadline to tick5; verification at tick3 and transfer at tick4 preserve the service. Both have zero authority breaches. Timing and the alternative change the consequence, not the wording of the permission rule. A fabricated need must still lead to no transfer. AGENTABSTAIN: COMMIT AUDIT AND TWO CONCRETE PAIRS Code revision cfc3faf7ab1cfd4892cde1158d6e43b2f312ddc3; dataset revision842228426c2a703347396501af61c7890972c7ee. Inspected commit_check.py uses critical-tool presence/absence. The CMS pair critical_tool_failure/preview_019 contrasts successful preview with persistent failure. Relief pair conflicting_evidence/preview_015 contrasts agreement with conflicting evacuation records. The inspected relief environment loads a current timestamp and uses it in receipts; no advancing clock or expiry loss was found. These pairs already cover failed verification and conflicting evidence. Our deadline outcome requires a different transition/scoring mechanism. Inspection of selected pairs and two environments does not establish corpus-wide absence. INFORMED ABSTENTION: REPRESENTATIVE MOCK CASES Version arXiv2606.02965v1, AppendicesA,C,E. The HR mock exposes employee lookup, bonus payment and status; DevOps exposes server restart and backup/deletion. The taxonomy and wrapper route missing preconditions into functional pauses. Its explicit budget discussion makes checking-time a close conceptual precedent. The inspected mock specification does not encode an expiring rescue opportunity. Do not call functional abstention or verification cost our contribution. https://arxiv.org/html/2606.02965v1 CIVEX: EXECUTE/EXPERIMENT CASE AND MISSPECIFICATION AUDIT Version arXiv2605.09168v1, worked add_index example and experiment/cost sections. It already compares abstention with useful execution and bounded experimentation. Version arXiv2609.40027v1 explicitly notes direct graph edits and idealized cheap randomized evidence. Our proposed attacker must use an allowed message/tool channel; our evidence delay must actually advance loss-producing events. No equivalent complete tool-world case was found in the inspected sections. Full implementation equivalence remains unresolved; originality is provisional. https://arxiv.org/html/2605.09168v1 https://arxiv.org/html/2609.40027v1 GRID CRISIS PROTOTYPE: ACTUAL INACTION CASE Revisionc8f89678eced8c89b18cc3ded181590fbe8eab6e. Inspected env/grid_env.py and scenarios/scenarios.py. The inaction_bias_probe models constrained generation and recognizes consequences of zero dispatch. The environment advances physics and computes a weighted reward; probe scenarios describe constant reward and action verifiers. Crisis simulation and consequential inaction therefore already exist. Our candidate contribution concerns matched evidence/necessity and verification delay, not inventing crisis dynamics. ASIMOV-AGENTIC AND AIR Read the official robotics report's stop, confidence and ambiguity sections and AIR's incident-response/overhead section. Both already measure useful-task costs of protective behavior. AIR explicitly measures added checking latency. We have not audited their complete implementation or all fixtures. This is an outstanding novelty gate before confirmation, not evidence that they lack every equivalent. https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini-robotics/Gemini-Robotics-2-Safety.pdf https://arxiv.org/html/2602.11749v1 WHAT THIS AUDIT SUPPORTS The minimal deadline fixture differs from the selected AgentAbstain and informed abstention cases in a demonstrable transition/measurement assumption. It does not establish priority over the entire field. The current implementation remains an exploratory extension candidate while AIR/ASIMOV/CIVeX case equivalence is unresolved. Do not spend on a confirmatory full suite or advertise originality until that gate is resolved. EVIDENCE RECEIPTS reviews/necessity-prior-art/*-inventory.json records repository/data revisions, file paths, source URLs and SHA256 of inspected bytes. No external code was run. Only our metadata and analysis are stored publicly, not third-party full texts or copied benchmark data. The timestamped catalog and budget plan are separate. FOLLOW-UP IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT AIR's current paper is v2,20June2026, which links the author repository. At revisiond455895f4b90610e7ee16dca5ae827a617b51044, inspected SDK hooks update incident context after tools, and an embodied rule specifies an alternate containment action. This already covers intervention/replanning. Neither that rule nor those hooks supplies our expiring verification opportunity and matched fabricated necessity case. This bounded inspection does not exclude every equivalent elsewhere in AIR's downstream environments. https://arxiv.org/html/2602.11749v2 https://github.com/FFchopon/AIR The author-linked open-ontologies repository contains a CIVeX-style port at revision9b2dfc24ebebe32e1127ba44e5047503729de40f. Its src/civex.rs explicitly labels its identifiability check a structural proxy and queues experiments for sandbox replay. It is not the paper's Causal-ToolBench implementation. Inspecting this scaffold cannot stand in for reproducing the original verifier/benchmark. Its tests cover ambiguous irreversible abstention and reversible experimentation. https://github.com/fabio-rovai/open-ontologies ASIMOV-Agentic public metadata revision7eee8032daafc536f69449622a8a287bc267c97e lists evaluation scripts/data, but file access requires contact-sharing acceptance. No conditions were accepted and no gated files were accessed. Public report/card inspection remains the scope. No absence of an equivalent case is inferred. https://huggingface.co/datasets/google/asimov_agentic New receipt inventories capture the selected files and their hashes. These are source-reading checks, not execution or independent validation of author results.